Onion Domes and Oligarchs

What's in a Name?

2010-08-06T10:29:00.004-04:00

Probably about one one-hundredth of the battle.

This is a silly, short little post because I'm pressed for time, but I just wanted to highlight an interesting little snippet of news from Russia: Dmitry Medvedev has apparently launched an initiative to change the name of the Militsia back to the pre-Revolutionary Politsia.

The name was, of course, changed by the Bolsheviks to appear more democratic, and to break the many unpleasant ties the revolutionaries, and even ordinary Russians, had with the tsarist-era body. It appears that Medvedev is attempting to do the same now, claiming that "we need professional people who are effective and who perform their work honestly. For that reason, I believe it is now time to return to law-enforcement bodies their name--'Police.'"

I don't know how effective this will be, as long as the same people are doing the same jobs with the same level of corruption and the same infrastructure as before. Without being entirely insensitive, that is one of the good things about a purge--it allows a total break with the past.

Without a purge (and please, let's not even talk of those kinds of options), the best way to institute change is to do so gradually, in small steps like this one. Perhaps the name change, if it goes through, will help inculcate a new generation of young people with post-Soviet, dare I say even European, values and expectations of their law-enforcement officials.

But this begs a certain question: is the problem really on the side of the people? I think not. So, Mr. President, change away--it's long overdue. But know that until real structural reforms in the militsia/politsia are passed, until officers are paid more, and until infrastructure and training within the agencies becomes better, it's just the same stuff in a different package.

The Effects of the ICJ Decision on Kosovo on the Frozen Conflicts of the Former Soviet Union

2010-07-24T03:00:00.003-04:00

Note: This is a cross-post from the blog of the NYU Journal of International Law and Politics.

That yesterday's advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, was decided on extremely narrow grounds has already been noted elsewhere in the blogosphere. Further, its status as an advisory opinion of course means that it is non-binding (though widely respected) and pertains only to the question asked of the Court by the U.N. General Assembly.

Nevertheless, it may be interesting to apply to the context of the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union some of the principles discussed in and generated by the Court's Kosovo opinion. After all, political leaders in Moscow have frequently (and threateningly) cited Kosovo as a precedent for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite the obvious and numerous differences between these cases. More after the jump.

The Kosovo decision is rather terse on the question of general international law applicable to unilateral declarations of independence, but it offered at least a three points that struck me as potentially relevant to the frozen conflicts.

First, there is the question of territorial integrity, which, as the Court notes in para. 80, applies only between states. It would not, therefore, violate this principle if a breakaway province declared independence, as that province would not bear the obligation in question. But this, of course, does not reach the actions of other states taken to aid burgeoning independence movements, as allegedly occurred in many post-Soviet conflicts. The Court's distinction between independence movements and states could be taken to imply that, in order for a declaration of independence to not violate territorial integrity, the organization issuing it must be untainted by external aid. Were a state to simply create a faux-independence movement within one of its rivals for the purposes of destabilizing that country, I find it hard to believe that a declaration issued by such a movement could be considered in a light similar to the Kosovo case. The line is thin and vague, but if it does indeed exist, I think there is a strong argument that the declarations of independence issued by Abkhazia and other breakaway republics are invalid from the standpoint of territorial integrity.

Second, in para. 81, the Court mentions that the legality of any given declaration of independence is highly fact-specific, and may be undermined by "the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law," in particular jus cogens norms. This determination will, of course, hurl us into the knotty debate of who fired first in the various post-Soviet conflicts. This is a question whose answer depends in no part on the timeframe considered; further, the true origins of a conflict may be obscured by the fact that many pre-date the collapse of the USSR, meaning that hard evidence is scant and memories distorted. Nevertheless, the stain of unlawful use of force by both sides in these conflicts may prove so indelible that the legality of any declaration of independence may be called into question.

Finally, by way of a small counterargument, I must point out that the Court found no applicable prohibition at general international law on unilateral declarations of independence (para. 84). Thus, it is not out of the question that declarations issued by putative states like Abkhazia and South Ossetia are indeed legal, or at least not completely illegal. Russia's involvement in their creation is, of course, questionable--especially in light of the NATO campaign that, while couched in humanitarian terms, essentially created the space that Kosovo's independence movement needed to survive and develop. The facts are, to my mind, quite different in these two cases, but that does not do enough to deny Abkhazia, its brethren, and their international supporters the plausibility required to support claims of independence. This, in turn, is all that is needed to keep them away from the negotiating table, and to further aggravating these conflicts.

Thus, for the purposes of the various post-Soviet frozen conflicts, as well as others around the world, the Kosovo opinion offers a mixed bag. It will be interesting to see how the case will affect the discussion of secession and independence in the future, although, like my colleague, Ben, I don't think there is much fodder for objective, academic debate in the text. The real fun will come when independence movements and their supporters begin trying to pound Kosovo into place to bolster their own causes.

Citizen Spies

2010-07-16T11:39:00.004-04:00

In my last post, I raised the concern that, by accepting Igor Sutyagin as part of the spy swap, the US might tacitly be admitting his involvement with some sort of illicit activities before his arrest. In turn, as I mentioned, this might lead to even further heavy-handedness on the part of the FSB in managing the relationships of Russian scientists and others with Western counterparts.

The draft domestic security bill that Medvedev appears posed to sign into law next week could exacerbate things even further, increasing the power of the FSB to preemptively restrict the speech or activity of Russian citizens and others. I haven't seen the text of the bill yet, but it doesn't sound good.

I can't help but again note that this type of legislation appears to counteract the thrust of Medvedev's recent visit to the US, during which he pressed hard to increase technical cooperation and foreign investment in Russia. That's going to be a very difficult task to handle if the FSB has such broad powers to intervene; the chilling effect of such powers will be very strong.

Sutyagin: Thrown Under the Bus?

2010-07-09T07:35:00.006-04:00

Haven't we met before in Moscow? No, I believe it was Vienna...

OK, so by now everyone knows that we've swapped out the 10 Russian sleeper agents for first one, but now apparently four people convicted of espionage in Russia. I wanted to avoid commenting on this until everything was said and done, because I thought it was just too fantastic to be true; boy was I wrong.

I really just have one quick point to stress: I am a bit disturbed by the inclusion of Igor Sutyagin, a former scientist and non-proliferation expert, with the three former SVR and FSB officers mentioned in the Times article. The details of Sutyagin's case are pretty complex, but the consensus is among Russian human rights types that Sutyagin was never guilty of espionage; rather, much like Aleksandr Nikitin, he was caught up in a wave of post-Soviet crackdowns on legitimate academics and scientists by a security service that failed to understand the new era of cooperation with Western institutions. That's a biased statement, but I believe it's mainly accurate.

Anyway, the inclusion of Sutyagin with the three former Russian intelligence officers in this swap is troubling because it muddies the waters of Sutyagin's innocence, in a way justifying the FSB pogrom launched against him and those like him in the late 1990s. Including him in the spy swap appears to corroborate the Russian government's accusations in a way that could endanger future academic cooperation with the West, extending the already massive chilling effect of the intelligence crackdown even further.

Yet at the same time, if Sutyagin was not actually guilty of espionage, why would he be on the list of people we wanted released? Was it out of humanitarian concern? There's some precedent for that, in the case of Natan Sharansky, but the campaign for his release was much more vocal than that for Sutyagin, it Sharansky's freedom had great political symbolism for the Reagan administration, then locked in an ideological battle with the "evil empire."

Another possibility is that this was part of the much-ballyhooed "reset" effort. If the this was the case, then this decision and the implications hinted at above (further pressure on scientists and academics by Russia's intelligence services), may represent a troubling retrenchment by the US, favoring a pragmatic improvement of relations with Russia over the human rights and freedoms of people like Sutyagin. While there are times when such pragmatism is highly beneficial, the potential ramifications in this case are worrisome--especially at a time when Russian efforts to draw in high-tech foreign investment will surely entail greater collaboration between Western and Russian scientists.

Don't get me wrong: I'm extremely happy to see Sutyagin walk free. But I'm very concerned about the circumstances that got him there.

1-800-SPY-ON-ME

2010-07-05T14:25:00.003-04:00

I really hope this spy scandal dies out quickly, because the media is running out of snappy one-liner titles for their articles (see, e.g., my winner, above). (Spies like us, Economist? Really?!)

So as the resident Russia know-it-all/blowhard among my law school friends, lots of people (seriously, like, three people) have been asking my opinion on this whole brouhaha, and in my responses I've pretty much been mimicking what I've written here.

The other night, though, a friend of mine made what I thought was a very interesting statement that mirrored and reinterpreted the "rogue U.S. faction" argument that I noted in my earlier posts. Instead of reasserting that the scandal and its timing was all the work of elements in the U.S. government bent on destroying progress in U.S.-Russia relations, my friend wondered if the Obama administration hadn't intentionally used the flashy arrests as a way to reassert dominance in the relationship while still maintaining an overall positive tone in their dialogue with Moscow (perhaps even allowing the White House to make a show of not letting the spies derail progress, thereby further increasing pressure on the Russians to remain committed).

As with all Kremlinology, there's little hard evidence to back up this sort of speculation (just as there's little to support my statements). After the scandal has run its course, historians will perhaps be able to reassess current thinking on U.S.-Russia relations, though often such conclusions are based on little more than inferences and third-hand comments. But all ideas should be kept on the table when attempting to read the entrails of this mini-crisis. Respect to my friend for coming up with a really interesting interpretation.

How Russia's Reaction to the Spy Scandal May Indicate Domestic Political Realities

2010-06-30T11:36:00.007-04:00

RFE-RL has an interesting selection of quotes on the spy scandal from Russian experts (a title I always take with a grain of salt).

The selection presents a very interesting contrast between views in Moscow--those of the opinion that I mentioned below, that the scandal is a sign of a rift or fight for control within the Obama administration, and those who feel that this is a normal occurrence between major powers that isn't bound to ruffle too many feathers.

Given the news today, it appears the latter view is likely to prevail (not too much surprise there, given our countries' mutual interest in improved US-Russian relations), but it's interesting to note again the positions of Putin and Lavrov on the matter relative to those of other (as yet unnamed) administration officials with cooler heads.

It makes you wonder a bit whether those officials who took, shall we say, a more classical view of the scandal, one involving a tacit coup from within the Obama administration, might be feeling a bit less secure themselves, as Russia attempts to reorient itself on its relationship with the West. That is, of course, total speculation--especially given the strong political support Putin enjoys within Russia, as well as the general feeling that the President serves at the pleasure of the Prime Minister, rather than the other way around. Further doubt may be cast on this interpretation by the fact that, as far as I know, Medvedev has yet to comment publicly on the spy situation himself.

As usual, things are far from clear in domestic Russian politics. But it does make things a lot more exciting...

[Insert Spy Pun Here]

2010-06-29T14:30:00.003-04:00

So, apparently we've got ourselves a little spy hunt. Tom Clancy must be psyched. It's pretty early to be commenting on the veracity of the charges, but I thought I'd point out something that has been noted before by other folks, but that is worthy of repeating in this context.

At times like these, it's very interesting to look at how Russia's leaders interpret operations within the US government; the theory is that they construe our actions in light of their own behavior and style of governance. According to the reporting I've seen, Putin and Lavrov are focusing intensively on the notion that the recent arrests were not an action based on the rule of law, but ordered by individuals within the US government who are bent on derailing US-Russian relations just as they are on the mend. In so doing, they are revealing the fractious nature of Russia's internal politics, as well as hammering home the point that for many Russian politicians, at least, the rule of law comes only after convenience and political necessity have been satisfied.

As I mentioned, this is not a new idea, but it's one worth remembering, both when attempting to predict Russia's reactions to US policies, but also when parsing everyday occurrences within the Kremlin.

Analysis of New Russian Freedom of Information Law

2010-04-30T16:23:00.001-04:00

Wow, it's been a while. But don't worry, I haven't been slacking. Since the summer, I've been working with the St. Petersburg-based Institute for Information Freedom Development on an comparative analysis of the new Russian freedom of information law (N 8-FZ from Feb. 9, 2009) and the US FOIA. The paper actually went up on IIFD's website in March, but I've been under water for while, so I'm just getting around to posting here.

A copy of my analysis, in Russian, is available here.

For those of you not inclined to read the full version, here's the nutshell analysis:

The new Russian law is a positive step forward for a lot of reasons. It offers most of the same protections as the FOIA, and even goes further by ensuring that internet kiosks are set up in various government ministries and buildings (libraries, etc.) to enable people to get online and see important info. The catalog of information available on ministry websites is impressive, including information on past investigations.

In other respects, however, the Russian law lags behind the FOIA (notwithstanding the American law's own problems). Many of the Russian law's provisions are broadly drafted, which leaves a lot to the interpretation of ministries and courts. In general, I was troubled by the possibility that Russian government officials, who are not known for their spontaneous fits of information-distribution, were given so much leeway. The law is a strong step forward, but still has a ways to go.

The Ukrainian Presidential Election and Roe v. Wade

2010-01-18T09:45:00.003-05:00

The Ukrainian presidential election is giving many a democratizer an important lesson in the dangers of overplaying one's hand. This is especially ironic, since the last election in 2004 was touted to have offered precisely the same lesson to Russia. Of course, there is more to the country's disgust with its erstwhile superstar President Yushchenko than just his ardent pro-Western stance--his efforts were often hampered by a ridiculous constitutional deal that was hashed out during the throes of the Orange Revolution, splitting powers between the executive and the prime minister. But it's safe to say that a great deal of backlash resulted from Yushchenko's policies.

Which brings me to Roe v. Wade. Without dipping into the merits of that case, there are scholars that claim quite convincingly, that massive efforts at social change like Roe, or for that matter even like Brown v. Board of Ed., should be left to the democratic process, rather than achieved through a hail-mary touchdown in the Supreme Court. To bastardize their arguments, Supreme Court decisions of this sort result in a great deal of backlash, in part because they become lightning rods for a still significant number of dissenters. (Compare the reaction to Roe to that following Lawrence v. Texas, when the Court was arguably further behind the social curve.)

It is better, the thinking goes, to slowly boil the frog through a series of democratic referenda, before sealing the deal with a constitutional decision, since this gives the electorate more time to get used to the idea of certain rights. Of course, that argument presupposes a certain amount of stupidity or at least acquiescence on the part of opposition voters that may simply not exist--I can't think of too many people who just forget about a political process simply because it takes a while. It also assumes that progress is possible through the democratic process, which is debatable at times. But the broader point remains that people prefer to deliberate, rather than having a controversial point shoved down their throats by forces seemingly beyond their control.

The same is true in "progressive" elections in the former Soviet Union. Empirically, only two color revolutions could possibly be deemed successful--in Georgia and Serbia--and both of those required a far more powerful catalyst to remain sustainable (even calling Georgia sustainable is a bit of a stretch). In Serbia, it was the sclerotic rule of Slobodan Milosevic and the ruin he had brought upon the country; and in Georgia it was a mix of anti-cronyism and subsequent strident anti-Russianism that has kept Saakashvili in power. But in countries like Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, where such motivating factors were largely absent, the pro-Western policies of the newly elected executives failed to find much traction.

In hindsight, it seems plausible at least that issues like EU and NATO integration, political liberalization, and the end of the post-Soviet system were better left to slow, plodding politics than the razzle-dazzle of street protests. On the other hand, of course, without the "revolution" of 2004, it would have been business as usual for Kyiv, just as abortions would have remained in legal limbo following Roe. Perhaps, then, the proper conclusion to draw is that, no matter how complete the failure of the color revolutions may seem, the long-term gains may yet be realized.

Russia Moves to Buy French Ship

2009-11-23T07:38:00.003-05:00

This is the smartest diplomatic move Russia has made in a long, long time. If it goes ahead to purchase one Mistral ship and the license for however many more, Russia will cement economic ties with France on a level that might help to silence French criticism for any future moves in Georgia or elsewhere in the "near abroad." Perhaps Moscow is taking a page from the playbook of its SCC ally/rival, China?

Okhta Tsenter on the Chopping Block?

2009-10-11T11:39:00.003-04:00

Kommersant is reporting that the Russian Minister of Culture, Aleksandr Avdeev, has asked the Prosecutor to investigate the planned construction of Okhta Tsenter, the new headquarters for Gazprom that was to be built in the center of St. Petersburg, on the grounds that the project contradicted federal law.

As usual with these kinds of disputes, I have few doubts that this has anything to do with architectural monstrosities or cultural preservation.

The Kremlinology here is too difficult to interpret this time around, however, as the players involved appear to all be from similar camps. Mr. Avdeev is a former diplomat, who worked his way up through the ranks of the foreign ministry (and probably therefore has relatively close ties to Putin).

Valentina Matvienko, the governor (aka mayor) of St. Petersburg and one of the project's principle backers, is a long-time Putinite, though she was rumored to have fallen out of favor in 2006. In that year an odd little waltz occurred when Matvienko requested Putin to allow her to step down as governor of St. Petersburg, which he did, only to subsequently reappoint her that same year. Matvienko is another former Foreign Ministry hack, having served as Ambassador to Malta and then Greece in the 1990s. She is also a member of the National Security Council of Russia.

Finally, Aleksei Miller, head of Gazprom, could be the odd man out, as his economics background could put him closer to Aleksei Kudrin's disfavored technocrats. But he and Matvienko should be linked by a common interest in the Okhta Tsentr project, meaning that Putin would be striking down one of his own (if, of course, Matvienko's ties to him remain strong). If, on the other hand, Matvienko is actually on the outs with the Prime Minister, this whole move might make sense.

The conclusion? Like any political move in Russia, the lack of transparency here makes everything nearly impossible to decipher. It could be a purely aesthetic choice, or it could be another manifestation of the ongoing influence battles inside the Kremlin.

Kadyrov Wins Libel Suit

2009-10-06T19:58:00.002-04:00

A Moscow court predictably ruled today in favor of Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov in his libel suit against NGO leader Oleg Orlov.

In keeping with my everything-has-a-meaning-in-Russia kick, though, I'd like to point out the small damages awarded to Kadyrov--20,000 rubles ($600) from Orlov and 70,000 ($1600) from Memorial, the organization Orlov runs. In theory, with Kadyrov asking for roughly $300,000, the court could have run Memorial out of town. Apparently the international opprobrium Russia would have faced for this was too much. Or perhaps the Kremlin benefits from the gloss of pluralism granted to Russia by Memorial and similar organizations. Or perhaps both.

Also interesting (and very threatening) for groups headed by vocal leaders (Kasparov, Limonov, etc.), note that Memorial was also found liable by the court for the words of its president. If that's the way these sorts of libel suits are going to work in Russia, and it's probably safe to assume that it is, the chilling effect on activists' speech will be even broader.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia: No Exit

2009-10-03T09:31:00.008-04:00

Russia, it seems, has painted itself and the rest of the international community into a very tight corner. By taking a diplomatic stance it cannot retreat from and recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign, independent states, Russia has both intensified and severely complicated the long-running internal conflict in Georgia. The Kremlin cannot back away from that position, for obvious reasons, nor can the rest of the world accept it. There is no Rhodesia option on the table either: with Russia a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it seems unlikely that the UNSC would issue a resolution condemning independence and forbidding recognition.

What are the options, then, for Tbilisi and the vast majority of the international community that does not recognize the two breakaway republics? The status quo will not do, for the simple reason that no matter how vociferously states object to Abkhaz and Ossetian independence, the longer those governments continue to exist, the closer they come to de facto sovereignty. Acceptance and recognition are also clearly not on the table.

A suit by Georgia against Russia in the ICJ for breach of the prohibition on aggression would be fraught with difficulties, most of which relate to the Court's jurisdiction. (As a side note, the pending ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo might yield some important legal ground for Georgia's claims, though Russia is unlikely to acquiesce to the application of such an opinion to the current situation.)

Abkhazia and South Ossetia both present troubling problems to the world of international law, as they represent another case of the impossibility of applying existing and well-established law. Russia, somewhat like the United States in Iraq, has invented a situation that gives it grounds to invade Georgia and interfere in that state's internal affairs. Yet, again like the US, because Russia is part of the P5, the UNSC is powerless; and because Russia will not, of course, agree to the ICJ's jurisdiction in the matter, the Court will also be unable to act. The UN General Assembly could request an advisory opinion from the ICJ under Article 96, but again, this would have only questionable effect on the actual situation on the ground in Georgia.

The only possible way out that I see is for Georgia to wait calmly for Russia's promises to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to ring hollow, while persistently objecting to their sovereignty. Tbilisi should offer Tskhinvali and Sukhumi as much aid and cooperation as possible, coupled with healthy doses of pragmatism ("Do you really want the Russians meddling in your affairs all the time?"). This, of course, has a range of unpleasant practical and legal implications: Georgia would have to somehow get through the physical and diplomatic barriers that exist between the territory it controls and that held by the breakaway regions; and in doing so, it could be seen to have acquiesced to their sovereignty. That is probably what Sergei Lavrov is seeking to do by pressuring Georgia to sign a non-aggression pact with Abkhazia. What is more, with Russian aid being pumped into the regions (notwithstanding the disputes as to how well that aid is being distributed), it is unlikely that Georgia could match Moscow's resources to provide a more attractive alternative to its breakaway territories.

I wonder how the climate is in Northern Cyprus this time of year...

Who the Hell is That?!

2009-09-30T14:18:00.004-04:00

Justyna Mielnikiewicz for The New York Times

This is neither here nor there, but I'd just like to point out that the soldier on the extreme left of this shot is wearing neither standard Russian military footwear nor fatigues; in fact, it looks like he's wearing sneakers and sweats. If that's the case, then I think the Russian military is in even worse shape than previously thought, or (perhaps more plausibly) the soldier on the left is a local fighter from Abkhazia or South Ossetia. I wonder if there's something in international law about professional foreign forces fighting alongside locals in civil conflicts....

EU Report on the Georgia Conflict

2009-09-30T14:00:00.003-04:00

It turns out that being a second-year law student means that you have no time to yourself. Ever. So I'm going to be very brief, and even sloppier than usual in treating the EU report on the 2008 Russian-Georgian Conflict. In doing so, I'm relying on the New York Times' version of the report, not having had time to read it myself.

There are two things, very briefly, that I'd like to note. First, I appreciated the report's noting the fact that Russia's distribution of passports to residents in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, beginning in 2005, was a blatant violation of international law, including the duty of non-intervention in internal affairs of other states under the UN Charter.

To distinguish the Abkhaz and Ossetian disputes from the often-bandied-about NATO intervention in Kosovo, there was no question of immediate threat to the civilian population from an aggressor state when Russia took its action. What is more, any threat that did exist was due to the breakaway regimes' intransigence and unwillingness to deal with what at the time were fairly reasonable policies emanating from Tbilisi. Further, this very intransigence was due much in part to Russia's persistent willingness to step in and support the breakaway regimes, dating back to the original conflicts of the late 1980s and early 1990s. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, any such unilateral intervention in an internal conflict would also have been in itself a violation of international law. Simply put, there is no legal basis for the Russian claim.

Second, I was interested to see that the report, at least according to the Times, blamed Georgia for initiating the hostilities by firing on Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali. This isn't a version of events I had heard before (the peacekeepers part, not the firing-on-Tskhinvali part), so I'll be interested to see what the back-story is to this when I take an actual read through the report.

I guess my larger point here is that, while the actions of both sides have been deplorable, Russia's breaches of international law, and more importantly the international community's near acquiescence to them, raise serious questions about many fundamental international legal issues, including the duty of non-intervention and the right to self-determination of a territory. The EU's report notwithstanding, it is disturbing to me to see such a lack of interest from the international community.

Quid Pro No

2009-09-20T10:30:00.004-04:00

While it may be easy to ratchet up the tension between Washington and Moscow, the Kremlin's response to the Obama Administration's move to revisit the US missile defense system shows that it is much more difficult to find a reverse gear for this process. Despite the US having decided to remove the contentious missile interceptors and radar systems from Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia has yet to respond in any satisfactory manner (besides moving to abandon its threatened deployment of Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, which Medvedev had already distanced himself from earlier in the year). Most importantly, Russia doesn't seem to be pursuing its end of the implicit bargain by pressuring Iran to drop its nuclear weapons aspirations.

There are, as usual, many potential conclusions to be drawn here, including the position that direct links between the missile shield and Russia's position on Iran should not be drawn, since other considerations (ie Russia's longstanding arms and nuclear-power contracts with Tehran) may also figure in.

But it is difficult not to believe in the wake of all this that the missile defense system was just another iteration of the standard pattern: Russia uses a Western strategic position as a justification for X behavior and then, when said position is modified or abandoned, the Kremlin quickly moves on to another pretext, never allowing the level of pressure to recede.

I, for one, am of the opinion that much of this positioning is for the Russian domestic political market—namely as a way for Putin et al. to keep the siloviki happy and in line behind the Prime Minister. This is, of course, unfortunate, because it repeatedly squanders fruitful dialogue between the US and Russia. This sort of political gaming is yet another example of the impact on Russian society and US-Russian relations of the deficit of the rule-of-law.

Prime Minister Putin's statements on Jackson-Vanik and Washington's resistance to Russia's accession to the WTO are an early indicator of what might be next on the table. The bevy of stupid and outdated US policies like Jackson-Vanik and missile defense provide ample music for this little dance, but one can only speculate that at some point we will begin to approach the limit of Washington's patience. Once that happens, it is unclear what the repercussions will be for US-Russian relations, as there appears to be very, very little room for pragmatism in the Kremlin these days.

When is a Snake Just a Snake?

2009-09-08T09:52:00.005-04:00

Sigmund Freud famously explained in a semi-apocryphal story that, his dream-interpretation theories notwithstanding, sometimes a snake is just a snake. But when can you tell?

In Russia, harking far back to the Soviet days, political motives have always been (often correctly) read into seemingly non-political actions. The Times ran an excellent piece in the Week in Review in August about how this affects US-Russian relations.

Essentially, the premise went, the actual conspiracies in Russia beget a deluge of conspiracy theories about nearly everything. This type of thinking is naturally infectious and has spread into Western analysis of Russian politics.

The point of this long-winded wind-up is that you could read many things into the recent decision by the Russian Prosecutor not to pursue criminal libel charges against Oleg Orlov, the head of the NGO Memorial, who implicated Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov in the death of Natalya Estemirova this past July. The first thing that comes to mind is that, while libel and slander are criminal offenses in Russia, they are most often pursued through the civil court system; the Prosecutor's actions, then, are just another iteration of this trend.

Second, some might argue that the decision not to press charges reveals the delicate balancing act played by the Kremlin and its local lackeys in pursuing their agenda of total control. Dismiss the criminal charges, then nail the bastards with stiff civil penalties. An ancillary matter to dropping the criminal charges is the decision by the court to postpone the preparatory hearing for the civil suit. You could interpret that almost any way you like.

Finally, the dropped charges could indicate, at least to some, that the Kremlin is reaching the end of its tolerance for Kadyrov, a man whose brutal tactics have until recently been successful in suppressing (separatist) violence in Chechnya and who the Kremlin may be loathe to let go. Kadyrov, like any regional governor, can be dismissed at will by the Federal center, as recently happened in Ingushetia.

Without a transparent political process, without the rule of law, and without a system of order that people can count on (other than Mr. Putin's fantastic pecs), this sort of back-and-forth wondering is all you get in Russia. This is the real tragedy of modern Russia, as it completely undercuts any short-term hope for a more stable future. The country is far too big to be ruled by a single person or even a smaller cabal, leaving as the only option a perverted federalism of conspiracy and sub-clans.

By the way...

2009-08-14T11:08:00.004-04:00

Putin, no matter how you spin it, Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and its establishment of an even larger (and officially offensive) military presence there, is still illegal. Just so we're clear.

I know you're listening...

Kadyrov Sues Memorial for Slander

2009-08-14T09:58:00.003-04:00

As he had threatened to do after the death of Natalya Estemirova, Ramzan Kadyrov has initiated a civil proceeding against the NGO Memorial and its head, Oleg Orlov, for slander. The grounds for the suit, of course, were Orlov's accusation of Kadyrov as the person responsible for Estemirova's murder, which were published just after her death.

As with most things in Russian law, much will depend on the various pressures placed on the court by, shall we say, the interested parties. Article 152 of the Russian Civil Code, through which most slander cases are handled, defines the term broadly, as unproven information that damages the honor, dignity or business reputation of a given individual, and that is somehow distributed by another party. Fairly basic.

No safe harbors are provided by this article, save the ability to prove the information in question. Courts may order a retraction of the damaging information, the publication of a counter-argument in the same media as the original information appeared, and so on. Those against whom the alleged slander was addressed may also demand moral and punitive damages, which is what's happening here.

Tanya Lokshina of Human Rights Watch, among others, has said that Kadyrov has no legal basis for his suit. I'm not an expert in these matters by any stretch, but going just by the law, I'm not so sure she's right. I think we'll have to wait and see what happens in court.

Academically, forgetting about all the deadly ramifications for NGOs that this case might have, not to mention the effect on Mr. Orlov's personal rights, this could prove to be an interesting indication of how much sway Kadyrov has on the federal level. This could also be an intriguing little exercise in the Russian government's obsessive quest to control its image.

There is, by the way, another, much more threatening road that could be taken: the 2006 anti-extremism law. The law itself, which like many Russian laws allows administrative, criminal, or civil penalties for offenders, would not bode well for Mr. Orlov.

The relevant text of the law, Federal Law No. 148-FZ of July 27, 2006, Section 1(a) defines extremism or extremist activity as "...the planning, organizing, preparing or conducting by civil-society or religious organizations, other organizations, the media, or other physical entities, of activities intended to: ...publicly slander a person occupying a post in the government of the Russian Federation or an [administrative subdivision] thereof, in relation to their official activities, by accusing them of committing an act covered by this statute, [ie extremism, murder, etc.] provided that this slander can be proven in court."

It doesn't appear that anyone has gone this route yet with relation to Mr. Orlov, which is certainly a good thing. The very existence of this law, however, is extremely troubling.

Two More Activists Dead in Chechnya

2009-08-11T11:02:00.003-04:00

The pattern is eerily similar: two Chechen activists kidnapped from their office yesterday were found this morning near Grozny, shot dead in the trunk of their car. To be perfectly honest, when I first saw the emails yesterday evening reporting the kidnapping of Zarema Sadulayeva and her husband, Umar Dzhabrailov, I felt certain of the outcome.

Predictably, the authorities were outraged, led by Chechen ~~Dictator~~ President Ramzan Kadyrov, who promised to make certain the police investigated this most recent killing. While he attempted to sound credibly upset, Kadyrov's choice of words was telling and, to those acquainted with Russian history, chilling.

"I consider this a slap in the face of the community, an attempt to scare the entire [Chechen] people and each resident of Chechnya individually.... Whereas [Natalya] Estemirova did human rights, pulled the wool over the eyes of society in both Russia and around the world, [whereas] she sometimes didn't tell the truth and after her death people said that she interfered with [the authorities], although really she didn't interfere, in this case I can't explain the murder of [Sadulayeva]."

I wonder what Mr. Kadyrov will do now, having personally taken charge of the situation, to answer this particular "slap in the face." One can only speculate that it will involve the lawful investigation and prosecution of those involved in this and other such killings, no matter what their affiliation might be.

The Need for a Cyberwarfare Treaty

2009-08-08T12:16:00.009-04:00

Which of these things is just like the others?

The recent reports of cyberattacks against Twitter, LiveJournal, and Facebook are only the latest reminder of the growing problem of cyberwar. Such attacks are becoming standard fare in campaigns of internal repression (see restrictions by China and Iran, among others, on social-networking sites) and external conflicts alike (Estonia, Georgia, and the recent North-on-South cyberviolence in Korea).

I wrote on this blog a while back earlier of the need to conclude a multinational treaty against the national use of cyberwarfare and including provisions for increased cooperation between national police forces against non-state actors carrying out such attacks. The necessity is only increasing.

The basic framework for a treaty exists already at international law in the form of the 13 UNSC provisions on terrorism and the basic laws on the use of force. The terrorism provisions (i.e. combat established terrorist cells on your territory, deny financing and material conditions, and so on) will cover the aspect of international criminal cooperation (just substitute "hacker" for "terrorist"), while it would not be exceedingly difficult to expand the purview of the prohibition on the use of force by states to include electronic as well as physical actions.

By internationalizing these obligations (especially anti-hacker cooperation between police forces), enforcement becomes easier through the accepted common law of state responsibility, as a failure to enforce could have economic or diplomatic repercussions. Thus, by forcing states to either combat the hackers or indemnify their international victims, it may become possible to suppress or reduce international cyberattacks.

Of course, this is easier said than done. There are jurisdictional issues, questions of infrastructure and cooperation, and the extremely difficult and thorny problem of investigation and potential wrongful accusation. Fear of misdirected punishment will surely result in an overly flexible law with large gaps between violation and enforcement (much like the current law on the use of force). I maintain, however, that the existence of an anti-cyberwar law (and the potential of liability for attacks) will exert enough downward pressure on cyberattacks to prevent or ward off some of the most damaging attacks.

States like Russia and China may initially be reluctant to include the non-state-actor provision in any law on cyberwar, but such a clause would be the real muscle of any effective prohibition, since most attacks come from ostensibly non-state entities. Foresight, however, shows that these and other similar nations are playing with fire: while they may not be on the receiving end of many such attacks for now, this cannot last, especially as business and government in the developing world become more dependent on the electronic infrastructure.

I would almost equate the current relationship of states like China and Russia with hackers (sponsorship and tolerance) to that of Pakistan with the anti-Soviet (or anti-Indian) mujaheddin in the 1980s and 1990s: they may be useful now, but they are sure to become a threat to their would-be masters in the future.

ODAO Exclusive! Footage from Russian Subs off US Coast

2009-08-05T07:53:00.002-04:00

ODAO's mole, deep within the Russian Defense Ministry, has remarkably been able to smuggle us this footage from the Russian subs that are off the US East Coast right now.

Seriously, someone get me Jack Ryan on the horn!

Cherkizovsky Market Closed

2009-07-28T06:35:00.004-04:00

As The New York Times mentioned today, the long-running Cherkizovsky market in Moscow has finally been closed. Authorities cited numerous health, building, and safety violations as the motivation for the closure of the market, which specialized in importing cheap, often counterfeit merchandise into Russia.

Yet as pointed out in the Times article, similar violations have been used as an excuse by the authorities in the past to close down other "troublesome" businesses like Yukos and Royal Dutch Shell's venture out in Siberia. The issue is that nearly every business in Russia is in violation of at least one law or regulation, simply because many of the laws and regulations are either extremely broad or contradictory of one another.

For example, when I was visiting my mother-in-law in the Urals last summer, I tried to use Adobe Reader on one of the computers in an internet cafe, only to find out that the police had inspected the place earlier and ordered all copies of "unlicensed" software removed from the machines there. Of course, the law says "no unlicensed software," but what about programs like Reader that are intended by the manufacturer for free distribution? Or what about linux-based programs, which by definition have no license at all. Under the letter of the law, having any such programs on your computer place you in violation, meaning the only thing between you and a fine or jail is the good will of the local authorities. Anyone that goes against the good graces of the government, such as opposition figures and NGOs, is especially vulnerable.

This is a return to feudalism, and cannot be the basis of any sort of effective government in the 21st century. If Russia is to ever develop its economy to its (massive) full potential, there needs to be a wholesale review of all the laws on the books, from top to bottom. This will inspire more confidence in the ability to do business and even to live happily, free from the whims of the police and the draft board. The alternative is a continued descent into corruption and random violence.

Russia and the US Dancing Around

2009-07-25T17:15:00.000-04:00

Vice-President Biden's remarks to the Wall Street Journal were not too bright, I'm not going to sugarcoat it. Then again, Medvedev didn't waste too much time after Obama's trip to Moscow in paying a visit to South Ossetia to reinforce his own stupid positions, either. Just what the hell is going on here, anyway?

In a certain light, it looks to me like the two administrations are still trying to feel each other out: to be as assertive as possible without being completely counterproductive. That's fine to do, of course, as long as you don't actually endanger the US-Russian relationship in the process. It seems, however, that both Medvedev and now Biden have step dangerously close to that line, if they didn't cross it altogether. I criticized Medvedev's visit to Ossetia in an earlier post, so I'll turn my anger on Biden for the meantime.

Biden, you jackass! What possessed you to say such pointedly stupid things to the press? Oh, wait, never mind. But seriously, Biden, the visit to Georgia and Ukraine was enough. You didn't need to go off on tear about Russia's "stupid" moves. Everyone knows those moves were stupid anyway. I really think you went too far on this one: instead of leaving Medvedev alone on the other side of the line, you had to join him in a tit-for-tat. Don't be that guy; don't play that game.

This is deeper than Joe Biden, however. This is a symptom of one of the largest foreign-relations problems the United States has faced in the past twenty years: the ongoing inability to form a coherent policy regarding Russia. Part of this is due to Russia's own unpredictability, but still more is a result of a lazy, clumsy approach to US-Russian policy that needs to end.

I know, I know: easy to criticize, hard to criticize constructively. Well, here's my take. First, we need to decide what we really need from this region. If we have decided to err on the side of productive (ie beneficial for the US) relations, as we have apparently done with China, and I think we have made that choice, then Biden went way too far in his remarks, full stop. If, however, we've decided to press the case of Georgia and Ukraine over our relationship with Russia, then Biden's remarks were simply ill-placed and useless, as they didn't really offer anything pithy on which to construct a feasible policy.

I think the Obama policy to be as pragmatic as possible with Russia, and to engage them as much as we can in order to soothe some of the tension, without giving up on US allies like Ukraine and Georgia, is feasible and half-way decent. In pursuing the latter half of this course, however, the White House and State Department should carefully assess exactly what the benefits and risks might be to unconditionally backing Tbilisi and Kyiv. They should also avoid, especially in the case of Georgia, making the current and future leadership so comfortable that they begin to act rashly. We need to explicitly let both Saakashvili and Medvedev know exactly where we stand.

The Same Old Game

2009-07-13T16:40:00.000-04:00

Just days after Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama had a relatively fruitful mini-summit, it seems like Medvedev is testing the waters to see how much he can get away with. Or perhaps he just wanted to show the US who's boss in the region.

As the Times reported, the Russian President made a surprise visit to the breakaway region of South Ossetia, which Russia recognized as an independent state last year.

The White House should issue a statement that the the recognition, as manifested by Medvedev's visit and by the opening of Russian military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, is contrary to established international law, including the UN Charter. This, of course, won't do anything, but the territorial integrity of Georgia is a significant enough issue that it shouldn't be sacrificed to the greater goal of US-Russian relations.

It might also do to remind the Kremlin that any territorial acquisition through the use of force, whether offensive or defensive (smirk) is also illegal.

As for what this might mean for US-Russian relations and the so-called "reset," I suppose we'll have to wait and see. But I don't personally believe this should inspire any confidence in the theory that Russia has moderated its regional-superpower stance at all. In other words, if this can be seen as an indicator of things to come, I think any steps towards redeveloping the relationship between the US and Russia will be small and potentially inconsequential.

Split the Difference?

2009-07-03T08:56:00.000-04:00

It seems like the Obama administration is up for trying some new tactics for their upcoming meeting with Medvedev—namely exploiting the (perhaps imagined) gap between the Russian President and Mr. Putin.

This could certainly go either way and, in my mind, is likely to inflame tensions more than resolve them. There may very well be a gap between Putin and Medvedev, but even if there is, Medvedev's role is clearly the lesser one, meaning we could find ourselves on the losing end of the equation when all is said and done.

It also follows from the general assumption that Medvedev was a short-term stopgap before Putin returns to power in 2012 that aggravating Putin could put us in an even worse position when he comes back to office. Of course, there's a question of how much farther Putin would be willing to go to make his displeasure known to the US after returning to power; he may find that he's gone as far as he can before hitting the limitations of realpolitik.

Seeing as the Obama administration has, rightly or wrongly, already embarked on a policy of divide and conquer, I'd like to throw my hat into the ring with a recommendation: if you really want to aggravate Putin, remind him that his own power is less than that of Medvedev: refuse to discuss issues of national security, international trade, and so on. Better yet, do it on the grounds of not wishing to meddle in internal Russian affairs; he'd love that. I would also try to refer to Putin as much as possible using his official title of Prime Minister.

For example, on missile defense, even if Putin tries to raise the issue with Obama in their talks, simply listen politely, thank the Prime Minister for his views on the matter, and promise to bring it up with President Medvedev. Then enjoy watching Putin pull one of these. Or these. You never know!

Gazprom Song

2009-06-29T14:02:00.000-04:00

Step 1: Prepare vomit bucket.
Step 2: Turn up volume.
Step 3: Press play.

Cyberwarfare is a Game-Changer

2009-06-28T21:30:00.000-04:00

Egad, fellows! I believe the "Russkies" have planted a "bug" in our computing machine.

One of the hot topics at the upcoming meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev is rumored to be a Russian-American cyberspace initiative. As the Times reported, the Russian side seems to favor a full-on treaty, while the Americans are coming out for an increase in international law-enforcement powers. Personally, I think there's room for both of these things in an agreement—in fact, I think that any cooperative effort lacking either law-enforcement provisions or full-blown treaty status will be half-baked and ineffective.

The reason is, of course, that cyberwarfare is a game-changer: unlike nuclear, chemical, biological, or space-based weapons (all the subjects of various international treaty regimes), the capability to conduct cyberwar is extremely decentralized—especially with the advent of collaborative computing, in which individual PCs are linked together to perform supercomputer-type feats of strength.

In other words, the threat could come from either governments themselves (hence the treaty aspect) or from unattributable non-state actors (law enforcement). Given the pervasive nature of the threat, I would also look for a clause of the agreement increasing the responsibility of governments to take affirmative measures to control known hackers and to track down the perpetrators of cyberwarfare within their territory (the latter being easier said than done, a factor that itself should be reflected in the nature of a successful treaty).

Happy negotiating!

Ummm, duh?!

2009-06-22T07:19:00.000-04:00

Because you were never warned about that.

Lose the Missile Shield!

2009-06-11T09:51:00.000-04:00

A little science fiction, courtesy of the gub'ment

Seriously, get rid of this stupid, half-assed missile shield idea. It doesn't work, it's screwing up our foreign policy goals, and it's getting in the way of more important objectives like disarmament. The only thing the shield is good for is as a cheap, throw-away bargaining chip in larger negotiations.

End of screed.

Dueling Statements from Russia on Strategic Arms Reduction

2009-06-10T13:41:00.000-04:00

Less than two hours apart today the AP released potentially contradictory statements by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Commander of the country's Strategic Rocket Forces, Nikolai Solovtsov.

General Solovtsov, whose statement went out first, claimed that Russia would be unwilling to go below a threshold of 1,500 nuclear warheads. Mr. Putin, who constitutionally is not responsible for national defense, said in a meeting with Germany's foreign minister that Russia would be willing to give up all its missiles if other countries made the same commitment.

I'm not sure how to interpret this, since the fact that Putin, and not Medvedev, made this statement would seem to reduce the weight of any perceived internecine conflict between the siloviki and the reformers. I do wonder, however, how credible the 1,500-missile level is, given the high cost of maintaining and securing these warheads. With Russia's defense budget stretched already, and with the civilian leadership clearly attempting to cut fat by downsizing officers, it would seem odd to hold to a larger-than-necessary arsenal.

That is, of course, unless General Solovtsov's remarks were intended for an internal audience, perhaps to convince the Kremlin of the necessity of retaining the bulk of the SRF in the face of ongoing military reforms.

A Reminder: No Expansion through Military Means

2009-05-31T19:47:00.000-04:00

Russian Forces in Georgia

As the New York Times noted today, the Georgian breakaway Republic of South Ossetia held parliamentary elections in which the ruling party won roughly 60 percent of the vote. The article also mentioned the fact that the Russian military has permanently established a base in the territory and has been using its own forces to patrol the border with Georgia.

I just thought it might be worth reminding anyone that's listening that territorial expansion via military means is prohibited by international law, even in a legitimate conflict in which your use of force was legal (absent a treaty of cession or international recognition, of course). Now, we haven't reached the point of Russian annexation yet, but given the fact that Russia's causus belli was the defense of its "own citizens," and the fact that said citizens attained that status through an entirely magnanimous and not-at-all-self-interested gesture from Moscow, it doesn't take an enormous leap of the imagination to see an attempt at full annexation coming.

Also, I'm pretty sure that granting citizenship on the entirety of the population of a region in another state could also be labeled as interference in that state's internal affairs—especially if said region is engaged in a civil war with the state in question. But hey, who's counting, anyway?

History Lessons: Why Khrushchev Had it Right

2009-05-28T10:02:00.000-04:00

Do you know this man? Really? Did you know that, in addition to having an unhealthy fetish for corn, Nikita Khrushchev actually developed a theory of nuclear deterrence that was way ahead of its time? So far ahead, in fact, that it freaked out the Soviet top brass and military traditionalists in the government, leading to his political demise. But let's back up, because this isn't about Russia. It's about India and Pakistan.

As the Washington Post reported today, both India and Pakistan are engaging in an amped-up arms race, with more powerful bombs, better missile technology, and the development of a US-style triad defense (subs, bombers, missiles). Not only is this militarily dangerous, but it's also unnecessary and could jeopardize economic growth in both countries. Pakistan especially should take warning.

So here's where Khrushchev comes in. In the 1950s, after he came to power, the Soviet Union lagged behind the US in the quantity of warheads it had available (though the US didn't know it at the time). It was also suffering from serious shortages in consumer goods, thanks to WWII and Stalin's persistent focus on the military and heavy industry. Khrushchev, in his own gut-feeling, blunt-object sort of way, knew this would sooner or later be manifested as a political problem for the leadership.

His solution? Spend less on defense, dummy! Over the 1950s he scrapped expensive plans for a Soviet blue-water navy, downsized the army by 50%, and reduced defense expenditures, relying on a minimum nuclear deterrence instead (I believe the phrase was, "we've got these bombs, so no one in their right minds would attack us; why are we spending so much on defense?!"). The plan was to use the extra funds to finance domestic development in housing, infrastructure and consumables like washing machines and fridges. This is remarkably similar to the strategy China adopted through the 1990s: a small number of missiles was seen as sufficient to provide defensive cover, making further expenditures on massive arsenals redundant and unnecessary. (Of course, China spent plenty on its military and faced less of a threat from the US than the USSR did, so the parallel is inexact, but close enough.)

Khrushchev's mistake (one of many) was that he relied on the illusion of a massive arsenal to provide the deterrent force, rather than openly disclosing the fact that he was unwilling or unable to deploy a large force. Partially, this was necessitated by a hostile US posture, but this was itself the result of tension precipitated by Stalin after the War. This illusion led Kennedy, before and after election, to ridicule the Republican defense strategy and to call for a massive build-up in strategic arms. Once this happened, Khrushchev's ploy was toast, as there was no way the touchy Soviet military and other hard-liners would stand behind him as he allowed the country to be out-missiled something like five to one. Khrushchev ended up being forced to do everything half-way, which led to things like the Cuban Missile Crisis and, eventually, his ouster.

It seems ludicrously naive to claim that dialogue would have resolved this vicious cycle so far down the line, and that's precisely the point: India and Pakistan must stop the mutual aggression NOW, before real, open dialogue ceases to be effective. Neither one of these states requires a massive nuclear arsenal, nor are they in need of a triad-style defense posture. The fact that they share a common border, which reduces early-warning times significantly, nullifies the efficacy of such a strategy.

The populations of India and especially Pakistan are in dire need of the funds being wasted on missile technology and increased warhead yield. Pakistani military dollars can most definitely be spent better elsewhere, and India could use the redeployed defense funds to support the infrastructure improvements it so desperately needs to continue its recent growth. Both countries could learn a lot by looking at the successes and failures of Khrushchev's policies and learning from his mistakes.

End of tirade.

Rogozin Op-Ed

2009-05-06T10:55:00.000-04:00

Russia, NATO, Rogozin, Op-ed. The saga continues.

The tone of Dmitry Rogozin's Op-ed in the New York Times today is troubling. Actually, deeply troubling, because it calls into question the direction of US-Russian relations just when many people were (prematurely) hoping things were improving. It also makes me wonder, as does almost any political statement from Moscow these days, exactly what's going on in the Kremlin.

Essentially, Rogozin appears to be saying that Russia has come as far as it is willing to come with NATO, and that it will not go further without a serious retrenchment coming from Brussels. That kind of ultimatum is just not helpful when you're trying to iron out a bunch of very large differences between two powers. Nor are the implicit threats of Russia turning to China, ceasing to be of any help with Iran, and so forth.

In fact, the demands that Rogozin essentially makes in his op-ed make me wonder if Russia, or at least the faction of the leadership that he represents, is really interested in a working relationship with NATO at all. (I know, right? Shocking.) You don't make demands your negotiating partner can't or won't meet (stop supporting Ukraine and Georgia) unless you're searching for a pretext to turn away from the table. All the talk about resolving the current raft of problems in NATO-Russian relations really amounts to a demand from Rogozin that NATO back down. This is fine for things like missile defense, but regarding Georgia and Ukraine—I just don't see it happening.

If that is what Rogozin et al. are trying to do, what are the implications? The most obvious conclusion (of many) is that Rogozin isn't speaking for the whole Kremlin (again, big surprise), and that the faction he does represent (siloviki) is trying to discredit whatever minor progress has been made between Washington and Moscow under Obama and Medvedev. If this is just one gambit in an internal struggle, NATO and Washington need to be careful about how they respond: too harsh a response could destabilize Medvedev (the lesser of two weevils) by discrediting his foreign-relations efforts; too soft an answer could even have the same result, as it could empower the siloviki by justifying their approach.

The next conclusion is that this may be a last-ditch effort by Russia to make the West pay attention. The threat to turn towards China is the most telling, as it would be an almost unthinkable move for the Kremlin to make. Since the 1960s China has been Russia's most feared regional competitor; the two countries fought briefly over the Amur river; and one of the favorite rumors in Russian kitchens regarding the neighbor to the East is that China is slowly populating Siberia with guest workers in order to take the whole place over. Russia is most certainly the lesser partner in the SCO; Given its touchiness over its status as an erstwhile superpower, the suggestion that Russia would entrench this position by increasing ties with China seems pretty improbable.

Rogozin's statement about Iran, which basically amounts to a threat that if the West doesn't play Russia's game, Russia will stop cooperating on nonproliferation, leads to much the same conclusion as the mention of China. Russia needs a nuclear-armed Iran like it needs a third butt-cheek. (Crude statements of anatomical necessity or the lack thereof are so fitting for international relations, don't you think? Very Fred Thompson.) It's just not in the country's interests.

Basically, if NATO and Russia are going to come to a workable agreement, a few things need to start happening. Both sides need to identify policies they're willing to back away from in an effort to meet in the middle. For NATO, this could mean missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic, perhaps coupled with less-unequivocal support for membership for Georgia.

For Russia, this means adhering to the agreed-upon post-conflict boundaries in Georgia, among other things. If Medvedev is in charge (yeah, sure), another good step would be to fire Dimitry Rogozin (the John Bolton of Russia) ASAP and put someone in the NATO liaison office who can actually work with the West. Russia can push and pull on the details, but when it comes down to it, it needs NATO as a hedge against China. Something's gotta give.

Activism by Map

2009-04-28T18:02:00.000-04:00

View Утраченные объекты социальной инфраструктуры Санкт-Петербурга in a larger map
Drag the map around or click on the dots to see what's what...

I found this completely by accident but thought it was so interesting that it needed sharing. Apparently a group of activists of some sort have decided to start using Google maps to publicize the deterioration of St. Petersburg's social infrastructure. This is, of course, not the first time maps have been used as a tool of social activism (the Google Earth maps of Darfur and other crises come to mind), but it seems to be unique in Russia.

I'm not personally familiar with this org, but from their site it seems like their goal is to increase civic participation in local government and the decision-making process. Anyway, it's a great idea, although the exposure might not be so broad.

A Little Good News from the Russian Military (Maybe)

2009-04-28T16:07:00.000-04:00

Dmitry Anatolyevich, let's make a deal: I won't hit the eject button and send you into the stratosphere if you'll agree not to demobilize me...

As reported in the Washington Post and elsewhere, the Russian military will dismiss roughly 35,000 officers over the course of the upcoming year. This is, it seems, the first wave of the reforms announced last fall.

As I've mentioned before, I see this going one of two ways. The first involves a slimmed-down, depoliticized Russian military that doesn't turn its conscripts into slaves (or maybe doesn't have any conscripts at all) and whose officers do more than just vie for cushy government jobs in large cities where they can get progressively fatter until they hit pension age. The second sees the military reforms as a political tool to weed out undesirables while retaining those with the best connections or clout, which would actually have little effect on the system's largest failings.

If I were being flippant, I'd go for the second option hands-down. Honestly, though, I think it's a tough call. How much cronyism comes into play will depend largely on the links between the layers in the bureaucracy—something that is often taken for granted in articles about the subject, but for which I've seen little concrete proof. The Kremlin is too distant from the mid-ranked officer corps to have much of an effect on specifically who stays and who goes, making the existence of strong, transcendent connections between the decision-makers and the decided-upon crucial for a cronyist result. I'm just not sure if those connections are there to the necessary extent.

So, what I'm say is that I don't know—a refreshing departure from the usual tone of my posts. Thus, the reforms could either be the best thing possible for the military or the most extensive chain of graft since, well, I don't know, the Albanian pyramid schemes? It's going to be a fun few years...

Antiterrorist Operations in Chechnya and Military Reform

2009-04-16T12:19:00.000-04:00

As the New York Times noted, Russia's National Antiterrorist Committee declared that antiterrorist operations in Chechnya have ended. In theory, it seems that this will have several knock-on effects, including a reduction of Federal control over travel in and out of the Republic.

In terms of military reform, a topic near and dear to my heart for no particular reason, this decision may have a positive effect. It may reduce the pseudo-feudal power exercised by FSB and Army commanders in the region, curtailing a vast source of income for some, but not all, of the people most vested in the current structure of the Russian military.

A reduction in the number of Russian troops in Chechnya might also have a beneficial social effect, in that fewer young men will pass through that particular meat-grinder, ending up dazed and violent at the other end.

As for what effect this will have on the ground in Chechnya, it seems most likely that it will only strengthen the power of Ramzan Kadyrov and his cronies. After all, nothing spells bribery quite like "local control over customs duties." An expanded local bureaucracy will also, of course, offer yet another avenue for increased patronage and, thereby, the promulgation of the weird moral and social controls Mr. Kadyrov has been interested in of late. Huzzah.

Note that this posting is filed under "Rampant Speculation," a category which, if I'd thought it out better, should actually be the title of this blog.

Dueling Viral Videos!

2009-04-13T10:30:00.001-04:00

Thanks to Jaime for this response to the official Godmol clip below.

Not sure how I feel about this (the homophobia is really what kills it for me), but I'd like to know where the money to make it came from.

Russian Government Produces Viral Video

2009-04-09T22:50:00.000-04:00

Man, I've been busy. Law school is hard work! Anyway, I just had to post about this...

Officially, this is a запрещенная реклама, a prohibited advertisement, meaning it won't be shown on television, but seeing as it comes straight from the website of the official government "Youth Year" program, it seems much more likely that the prohibition is just a clever advertising gimmick to make the clip seem more edgy.

Let's break it down. On the surface, sure, it seems great: YOU! HELP RUSSIA! SERVE YOUR COUNTRY! But when you consider the video from almost any perspective—from the color palate to the use of historical clips from the Soviet past—there's really only one conclusion to make: Nationalism, boys and girls! It's not just for faux-underground youth groups anymore! Now we're in the big leagues.

Speaking of the faux-underground, this video reminded me a lot thematically and visually of some of the stuff Nashi used to put out. Remember them? Yeah, me neither. Soooo 2007.

Anyway, enough talk! Get off your video-game-playing ass, get a government job (aka join the army), build some missiles, get married, and procreate (a lot)! Otherwise, "нас раздерут на части при первой возможности!" (They'll tear us apart the first chance they get.") I wonder, who could "they" be? Does it matter? It's them! We hate them, whoever they are!

Some oddly dark spin for a government program with such a cheesy website, no?

Deepening Cracks in the Facade

2009-02-25T09:54:00.000-05:00

As I mentioned in my last post, there's a growing sense among the bloggeratti that the current economic crisis is exposing the divisions among the factions of what one might call the Putin coalition—the siloviki, economic pragmatists, businessmen and liberals that came together to form different parts of the Putin-era government. The recent corruption probes at the Finance Ministry are just the latest example.

Some opposition figures, most notably perhaps Garry Kasparov, have said that these sorts of divisions will weaken the current regime and provide the opportunity for a completely new government to effect the change Russia so deeply needs. Without sufficient oil revenues, the thinking goes, Putin will be unable to provide the capital necessary to spackle over the cracks, and the system will collapse.

The question is, however, is that what's best for the Russian people? Any collapse of this kind will almost undoubtedly lead to either all-out civil war or to an extended mafia-style conflict between the various branches of power. The latter is only a short step away from the inter-agency infighting that we've seen in recent years (see Tri kita, the Procuracy vs. the Ministry of Justice, etc).

Just be careful what you wish for is all I'm saying...

The Decline of Putin?

2009-02-02T10:16:00.000-05:00

Many who know me will tell you that I'm prone to wild flights of fancy. My broad speculation on the war in Georgia (that it was brought on because Saakashvili couldn't fulfill his promise to reunite the country and couldn't just give South Ossetia and Abkhazia away, and so needed an "honorable" way of ridding himself of this large impediment to NATO membership) is a good example. So is this post.

The past week has seen a couple of odd departures from the standard Kremlin rhetoric. Russia has decided to put the deployment of Iskander missiles on hold while the US sorts out its missile defense plans. President Medvedev recently commented to Russian journalists that he avoided making any statement to the press in the wake of the killing of Russian human-rights lawyer Stas Markelov in order to avoid influencing the administration and biasing the investigation. And Putin spoke out against undue government regulation and meddling in Davos. Hurray.

Naturally, this has Russia-watchers all atwitter. Clearly, the economy and the new Obama administration has much to do with all this. Having pissed off both the EU and the Americans with its foray into Georgia and its meddling with the gas market, Russia may be recognizing that the time has come for more conciliatory rhetoric. Perhaps Medvedev even listened to my advice. Right.

But I'd like to go further with this. Not, I stress, because I buy any of this at all, but just as sort of a thought experiment. Or something. Let's say that one of the following two things is really happening. First, Putin appointed Medvedev as a way of softening Russia's image while retaining plausible deniability himself in order to stave off the hardliners on whom Putin became somewhat dependent toward the end of his second term. Or, Medvedev is exploiting Putin's weakened condition to push forward his own more liberal agenda. At first glance, either theory is plausible.

Putin started out his presidency focused on revamping Russia's economy and its standing in the world. By the end of his eight years in office, he may have felt that things were going (reasonably) well in the economics department, but that the country's influence was sagging due to its overly aggressive and combative positions on issues like the "near abroad" and Iran. (This theory, of course, is predicated on the notion that Putin was not fully in control of his own affairs and that he, to some extent, was forced to rely on or cede power to the siloviki, for whatever reason.) Medvedev, who depended on Putin alone for power, was a step away from the siloviki, and thus may have been viewed as the best way to make painful but necessary reforms in the government to allow the country to move forward.

Of course, this first theory is partially damaged by two things: first, if Putin was dependent on the siloviki, and Medvedev dependent on Putin, how much separation could there have been between the new president and the Moscow power-brokers? Second, if this was the case, why did Medvedev continue and even advance so many Putin-era policies before retrenching? Was he waiting for breathing room, or just trying to grab as much power as he could before making a series of flashy but on-the-whole meaningless concessions in order to gain influence?

The second theory, that Medvedev is beginning to turn against Putin, having seen his chance to do so in the country's ongoing economic woes, is also vulnerable to these counterarguments.

The truth is, obviously, that there's no way to tell just at this moment what exactly is going on in the Kremlin. If there is some sort of tacit coup in progress, we probably won't know about it for at least another year, perhaps more, in true Moscow fashion. Again, I'd like to stress that I don't fully buy either of these lines of thought—it's just interesting to speculate.

We Have Officially Enterred a Bizarro Universe

2009-01-28T22:46:00.001-05:00

Could someone please tell me just what the hell is going on?! First the Russians stop the non-deployment of missiles to Kaliningrad (non-deployment because apparently they didn't have enough launchers to make actual deployment a reality), then Putin has a kumbaya moment at the World Economic Forum, and now Medvedev has decided to scuttle that crazy bill about espionage and treason.

That's all, just a late-night expression of complete surprise.

Iskander Deployment Halted in Kaliningrad?

2009-01-28T10:53:00.000-05:00

An Iskander missile at launch

This morning there came, via an anonymous source in the Russian Defense Ministry, a message that Moscow was prepared to halt the deployment of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. This is, if true, a positive step, as the Times notes.

But I'm wondering if it's not too early. My worry is that, with Obama distracted by the economy, torture, US military policy in Afghanistan and Iraq, and so on, have the Russians made a move that he can't possibly answer in a timely fashion? And, if so, what repercussions will the failure to answer this move have for US-Russian relations?

This is, if you will, like in The Wrestler, when the main character is trying to reestablish relations with his daughter (I saw it last weekend, so it's fresh in my mind): if you do things right, everything works out; one screwed-up signal, though, one failure to live up to expectations, and it's all over.

I guess what I'm saying is that I wish the Kremlin had chosen to take it a bit slower before making this move... I can only wonder if their haste was deliberate or not.

The Kremlin's Dilemma or "Shall We Play a Game?"

2009-01-16T09:51:00.001-05:00

Greetings, Professor Medvedev...

Let's get ready for some hackneyed, amateurish political scieeeeeeeeeence! Ahem, sorry. Anyway, in my legal writing class the other day we played through a couple of classic game-theory scenarios, including everyone's favorite, the prisoner's dilemma. What's this got to do with Russia, you ask? Sit back, I say, and let the tenuous analogies fly.

So everyone pretty much knows the deal: two prisoners, you can't communicate, you're both in prison and the fuzz is coming down hard on both of you to get you to squeal because they don't have enough information to put you away. If neither of you talk, you both get six months; if one talks, he walks, while the other stoically sits out 10 years in Attica. But if you both talk, then you each get five years. Or something like that.

In this case, however, we were playing with money, and we were going through multiple rounds. Each round, the stakes increased if you squealed and your partner stayed silent, so by round 8, I had the chance to walk away with a cool $25 if I sent my buddy to the slammer. My partner and I, enlightened individuals both, instantly cooperated with each other and stayed silent because we knew the drill. Round after round, we smiled and nodded to each other as we kept quiet.

In the last round, something hit me: this guy's a chump. I can take him, take the money, and walk off. I can steal the money and run because after this round, I'm gone anyway! So I did it, knowing full well that, because of the structure of the game, we would have collectively come away with more money (if we shut up, we got $15 each or $30 together, as opposed to the $25 I got on my own).

I did it to cover my bases because I didn't trust him not to make the same move himself, and because I knew (or believed) I wouldn't be around to play again anyway. I also did it because I didn't know how the scoring system worked: I thought there was a chance that we were playing against each other, rather than as a team. My choice stemmed from uncertainty, mistrust and cynicism.

And then it dawned on me: this is exactly the thinking among the current Russian regime! It has to be, give or take a variable here or there. Why else would you consistently choose to take less money now instead of more money, plus the added bonus of a functional country, over the long-run?

Yes, it is completely naive to expect people to do otherwise, thank you for asking. The game itself, in its hypothetical form, shows that players will settle around the equilibrium point where both squeal on each other. But other countries have, again more or less, been able to avoid this deadly cycle by establishing rules and institutions that foster trust and psychological security among the "players." The fact is that you "play" differently when you feel certain that you have some sort of support network, for example, the law, to back you up and keep your "opponent" in line.

The game is a perfect example of what happens in a pure, cut-throat, naked economic system with no interference or support from the side. But that's not the way most countries work anymore, is it?

New Year's Memo to Pres. Putin Medvedev

2009-01-01T16:37:00.000-05:00

With the press corps brimming with eager memos to various leaders (see, for example, The Economist's recurring column, "Barack Obama's Blackberry"), the time seemed right for ODAO (now with spiffy acronym!) to get into the act. So here goes.

Respected Dmitry Anatolyevich!

Congratulations on your first New Year's as President. As you noted in your New Year's Address, 2008 held for Russia a series of ups and downs. I would revise that to more downs than ups (pardon the Russian-lang. pun, it's not intended), but that's just my opinion. Regardless of whom you ask, however, 2009 promises to be a challenging year for Russia, and it will demand the utmost skill and concentration to navigate successfully. My humble recommendations follow.

Make More Use of Russia's Soft-Power Potential

During the past decade, Russia has developed tremendously and has returned to the stage as a world leader. It is important to use this position responsibly, both in order to retain influence for the long-term and to maximize your potential in the short-term. Europe and the United States are still your most important trading partners, and you need them as investors if you intend to counter Chinese dominance of Eastern and Central Asia. Without them, especially with the decline in oil prices, you will not be able to find the economic means to develop your infrastructure, technology and manufacturing centers—all of which you must do in order to evade the fate of a typical petro-state.

I am thinking primarily of Russia's relationship with Georgia and Ukraine, and the knock-on effects this has with the West. In part, with the economy contracting, your hand may be forced away from military muscle-flexing anyway; the beginning of Barack Obama's first term as US president will provide the opportunity for a new period of US-Russian relations as well.

With Georgia, the die is mostly cast already: it's not like Russia can retract diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But by softening the rhetoric, moving back towards quasi-normal relations with Tbilisi, and moving away from your Cold-War era anti-NATO stance, you could make serious inroads with the West without sacrificing your strategic position.

After all, what do you have to lose: Georgia will not assume a pro-Moscow stance in the foreseeable future, especially if you keep up the pressure; and needling Ukraine only feeds the Orange flame. By taking a more conciliatory stance on each country, you might actually end up with more influence over them, as well as a less confrontational relationship with NATO. Look to President Obama and the other Western leaders to uphold their part of the bargain as well (missile defense, anyone?).

Finally, I'd like to point out that, because of your current position, which is beginning to verge on pariah status, even the smallest step you take toward cooperation will be heralded as a great leap forward by the West, and will probably be rewarded in a way that is disproportionately favorable to you. Remember, engagement is neither a sign of weakness nor a losing move. Your economy will thank you.

Work with Civil Society

This will not be easy, but it is necessary. By introducing ever more restrictive measures against legitimate civil society and supporting only those groups that meet with Kremlin approval, you are removing the most important element of proper, functional government: external perspective. The thing is, you need the NGOs. You may not like what they say, but you need them to prevent the stagnation and corruption that is already setting in. Stop this nonsense about espionage and treason, and allow Russian civil society to flourish! And by civil society, I mean the real deal, not that cockamamie Public Chamber...

Politically, this might be a good move for you as well, since it will weaken the siloviki on whom you are so dependent. Before they try and assassinate you for killing their cash cow, however, you might want to explain to them that an open, fully functional economic and political system is in their best interest, too: the more efficient the machine, the more it produces and the richer everyone becomes.

The alternative is an ossified state ruling over an increasingly distant public—a situation that has never ended well for Russia's ruling elite. You would do well to remind certain members of your government and cabinet of that fact; when the collapse comes, and it always does, they stand to lose big-time. Those protests you've been experiencing lately? They can only get worse, as will the country's economic situation unless you listen to the civil society activists and confront Russia's corrupt system head-on.

The army, rampaging human-rights violations, a hostile business climate; you name the issue, there's an NGO with the solution. And by letting them all speak up with impunity, you will be more likely to happen upon a viable option. Of course, doing this at an economically unstable time could be risky, but when the money's flowing the problems more entrenched, as there is disposable income available for use as bribe money. You essentially must choose between perpetuating all the worst parts of the Putin era (out-of-control corruption, nepotism, ineffectual distribution of power) and making Russia into the international powerhouse it could be.

Like a more conciliatory stance on Georgia and Ukraine, the likely indirect effect of removing pressure from NGOs and opposition movements is a glut of favorable attention on Russia from abroad. (Remember how the business community swooned when Putin liberalized the tax system?) That, in turn, will lead to an increase in Russia's diplomatic and economic potential, and will turn the Kremlin into a reliable alternative to the White House—or at the very least a respected and influential player on the world scene.

That is, after all, what you want, right?

Happy New Year, Mr. President.

С Новым годом!

2008-12-29T15:02:00.000-05:00

Happy New Year!

Proposed Military Reforms Could Just Make Things Worse

2008-12-17T15:22:00.000-05:00

I'd like to break with tradition and do something new on this blog: say something positive about a decision made by the Russian government. Ready?

The proposal to reform the Russian military is one of the most prudent moves the government has made in recent memory.

There, I said it. Now, back to business. The problem is that, while it will address several core issues with the currently bloated general staff and the lazy, privileged officer corps, if not done properly (i.e. by spending, and this is a technical term here, an assload of money) it could lead to a rash of troubles that Russia hasn't seen since the early 1990s.

I'm speaking chiefly of small-arms proliferation and a general siphoning off of military resources. Back in the day, this illicit trade was conducted mostly by unpaid officers and other personnel in order to keep themselves above water. In this case, it would be the recently fired soldiers to look out for.

Here's why. As in most armies, the majority of current Russian personnel live on-base. Russia is currently experiencing a major housing crunch, which is only due to worsen as the economy slows, construction projects are sidelined and developers leave the business. Russia also stands to experience a sharp upswing in unemployment, dumping more than the usual number of jobless folks into the market.

Ordinarily, these three things would not seem to be closely related (well, ok, maybe the last two), but here's the deal: you trim a whole bunch of military personnel, who typically don't have a broad skill set and therefore can't get jobs normally, and send them into a worsening employment market; you also, having revoked their salaries, have no where for them to live, meaning that they're probably going to stay put on-base, at least for a little while. Remaining on-base means that this personnel also retains much of its access to weapons stores and, well, the rest is obvious.

There's also the tiny issue of having a bunch of newly unemployed men with lots of weapons training in a country that's kinda known just a tad for mafia activity...

All I'm saying is that the Russian government had better do this thing right and have a full cradle-to-grave plan for executing these reforms. It's not enough to just cut these soldiers loose and call it modernization--they need to be provided for. But with the crop of new spies and traitors that will be running around Russia come next year, the government may have its hands full with more pressing matters.

To Catch a Spy: Proposals to Expand Definition of Espionage, Treason

2008-12-17T14:57:00.000-05:00

As RFE/RL's excellent blog, The Power Vertical, noted today, Russian lawmakers are toying with amendments to the criminal code that would greatly expand the definition of treason to activities that undermine the constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia. Espionage would also be broadened to include revealing state secrets to foreign NGOs.

As a former democracy-promoter myself, I can't help but note, as many already have, that these revisions to the criminal code would simply eviscerate the work of many Russian NGOs. For example, the work of Aleksandr Nikitin, the director of the Bellona Foundation who was accused and later acquitted of treason in the 1990s for publishing open-source data about nuclear accidents on Soviet and Russian subs, would easily fall into the new definition. Soldiers' Mothers could just as easily be prosecuted for disclosing state secrets: conscription rates, beatings of draftees, and so on.

This is important work that benefits the Russian people and, if they weren't too dumb or paranoid to realize it, the government as well. Labeling it treasonous will, of course, be the death knell of independent debate, permanently hindering the government's ability to take stock of itself objectively.

I would also like to point out that even the salaries of government officials are considered state secrets, a fact that has Dick Cheney salivating as we speak. There is almost nothing that an NGO, opposition leader, or even a private citizen can do that would not qualify as espionage or treason here. Combine that with recent laws making it illegal to criticize your political opponents during elections (not to mention the intrusive reporting requirements passed in 2006) and what do you have...?

A Brief and Belated Response...

2008-12-16T09:31:00.000-05:00

...to Charles King's piece in the November/December Foreign Affairs.

I, in my uneducated opinion, agree with many of the things that King says in his article, but I would like to point out an issue that he doesn't address and then disagree slightly with his conclusion.

First, in summarizing Russia's actions leading up to the 5-day war in August, it was interesting to note that Professor King left out what I see as a crucial (and illegal) step towards conflict: Russia's en-masse grant of citizenship to the majority of the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

If I recall properly, this was done in early 2005, and at the time it was brushed off or simply ignored. But the fact remains that this appears to be a gross breach of international law and a serious violation of Georgia's sovereignty. For one country to simply ignore the internationally recognized boundaries of another and launch a soft invasion with passports instead of tanks is unacceptable. This is not to excuse Georgia's share of the fault in the conflict—simply to point out something that was largely ignored in the coverage that I read.

Second, as I understood it, King argues that Russia was locally successful in its own propaganda war, in that the majority of Russian citizens felt that Moscow's actions were justified. This doesn't seem to be an achievement worth mentioning, given the government's strict control over the media and the message presented to the public.

The efforts of Russia Today notwithstanding, I think it would be difficult to find many people outside the former Soviet Union that supported Russia's actions. In fact, given that Moscow struggled to gain diplomatic recognition for Abkhazia and South Ossetia even within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it seems that King may have grossly overstated Russia's current ability to use the language of stability, humanitarianism and prosperity to win over international audiences.

How Russia does in future conflicts with the West remains to be seen, of course, and, as King suggests, much will depend on Moscow's relative ability to spin events in its direction. I'm just not so certain that they will be as successful as King seems to believe.

Xenophobia Watch: African-American Student Stabbed

2008-12-15T13:04:00.000-05:00

The Moscow Times is reporting that an African-American exchange student from Providence, Rhode Island was stabbed in Volgograd on Friday. He is listed in stable condition at a local hospital. Police have not determined the motive of the crime, but believe that it may have been racially motivated.

Having Kicked Out Migrants, Moscow Now Short of Construction Workers

2008-12-15T12:47:00.000-05:00

RFE/RL is reporting that construction projects in Moscow are experiencing a severe shortage of labor. Managers are now seeking to draw in qualified personnel from Belarus to fill the gap.

Belarusian workers, as citizens of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, don't need the work permits required of gasarbeitery from Central Asia. Also, being Slavic themselves, they'll probably be left alone by the skinheads and sanctioned youth groups that have plagued Central Asian and Caucasian workers recently.

I'd just like to point out that the main slogans in the various anti-immigrant campaigns in Russia, as noted below, generally involve themes like immigrants stealing Russian jobs and robbing the Russian workforce, which is willing and able to work, of their pay.

Xenophobia Watch: Severed Head Found in Moscow

2008-12-11T13:26:00.000-05:00

Kommersant is reporting that the severed head of a migrant laborer from Tajikistan was found in a dumpster in Moscow, four days after his body was discovered in one of the city's suburbs.

An extremist group, the Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists (Боевая организация русских националистов), claimed responsibility for the killing in a threatening letter to the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, a local NGO. In the letter, the group described the killing as "a gift for the bureaucrats of the capital from the Russian people, who are not without an opinion on the invasion of our city by migrants."

Xenophobia in Russia: The More Things Change...

2008-12-09T10:59:00.000-05:00

...the more they get cliched by hack bloggers.

Lots of people have been making lots of comparisons between lots of other people and Hitler. You may remember such Hitlers as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and, if you believe Ann Coulter, Barack Obama. Great! Russia has seen its share of comparisons to Wiemar Germany as well, some closer than others to the truth. That's not where I'm trying to go with this.

All I'm saying is that over the past few years, there has been a disturbing trend toward nationalism as a panacea for Russia's ills, coupled with increasing violence against foreigners. I saw some of this myself while I was in St. Petersburg in 2004; at that time it was mostly skinheads beating up or killing foreign students.

By 2007, you had groups like the "Mestnye", a political youth group allegedly funded by the governor of Moscow Oblast, holding rallies against illegal migrants working as underground taxi drivers, a campaign which included a lovely video of a khachik cabbie trying to pick up a svelte, blonde Russian girl. ("Eh, Deh-vushka, paaah-yekhali, ya tebe dovozhu do doma, dorogoi...") The video's been taken down since, but oh well.

Anyway, it seems we've moved on a step. This week the Molodaya Gvardia, or Young Guard, the youth wing of Russia's main political party, held a rally blaming the economic crisis on illegal migrants and calling for their expulsion. The main slogan was one that echoed that of the government following the expulsion of illegal Georgians last year: "Our money to our people!"

This is no longer an unorganized band of skinheads beating up some students, here; nor is this even a second-rate group like the Mestnye. This is a front-line political youth organization using migrant labor as an economic scapegoat. All, meanwhile, against the background of various ultra-nationalist "Russian Marches" being held across the country, apparently with official sanction.

Draw your own conclusions...

Missile Defense

2008-12-06T19:14:00.000-05:00

Of the many, many things wrong with the US's missile defense system—poor performance, cost overruns, questionable value—I probably don't need to tell you what my biggest problem with the thing is: that it's screwing up our relationship with Russia for no good reason.

Now, don't get me wrong, I'm not advocating that we all walk around on tiptoes to please Moscow. It's just that, in foreign policy, you really shouldn't make it a practice to continually piss off countries that, like it or not, you have to deal with. Basically, you've got a small handful of jerk cards–things that you want to do but that really anger your partners, like recognizing Kosovo—that you can play during any given presidential administration. You need to hold on to them until just the right moment: you really need to pick your battles.

This approach has two benefits, actually. First, you don't squander your international good will with a bunch of futile but incredibly irritating moves. And second, you don't have to go over-the-top playing nice to make up for it. Take the G8 for example: I honestly think that we'd have a lot better chance of ousting Russia from that body over its absurdly horrendous human rights record if we hadn't blown all our cards on a system of questionable utility that may or may not be targeted at a non-existent threat.

Don't we have better things to do with our money and diplomatic good will?

NATO Expansion - Wrong Move?

2008-12-03T15:52:00.000-05:00

Some bad news on the face of it for the Georgians: NATO denied Tbilisi a Membership Action Plan this week. Many optimists tried to couch this in terms of another "not if, but when" decision, as they did after the Bucharest summit in April, but this begs the question of whether expansion is worth it, or even if it is necessary at all.

Democracy-spreading types like to treat NATO expansion as sort of a first step toward membership in the EU, and in a certain sense, this is the case. NATO brings with it all sorts of transparency measures and required civil-military reforms that help developing democracies make the transition.

But given the amount of tension NATO generates with Moscow, and given its symbolism as the Cold War adversary of the Soviet Union, would it not be better to pursue these baby steps in a less controversial way? Edward Lucas, deputy foreign editor of The Economist, alluded to something like this, predicting "specific programs of modernization and military reform" without the word "membership" attached. The current Russian regime seems to thrive on symbolism inherited from the Soviet past, so perhaps one of the best ways of deflating their rhetoric is to deprive them of convenient targets like NATO.

Of course, to many (myself included), stepping away from our aggressive policy of pushing NATO deeper into Eastern Europe feels like handing a win to Moscow – but perhaps we too are caught up in symbolism from a bygone era. The fact is that NATO expansion, in its present form, seems to run contrary to our stated policy goals in Europe–reducing corruption and maximizing transparency–by unnecessarily antagonizing the Kremlin on the macro level and providing fodder for anti-reform political factions (like the Party of Regions in Ukraine).

Luckily, we've reached the perfect transition point: the end of the Bush era gives the US an opportunity to shift its policies, while the steep drop in oil prices may blunt Russia's ability or desire to upset trading partners in Europe by throwing its weight around. With the reasons for conciliation mounting on both sides, NATO's leaders seem to be making the right moves to take advantage of the situation.

Judicial Oversight Update

2008-12-02T18:19:00.001-05:00

Now RFE/RL is saying that Medvedev's decision to focus on judicial reform was motivated in part by the flood of Russian cases going to the European Court for Human Rights.

Sounds like a plan, until you get to the part about people choosing the ECHR over the Russian courts. This may be news to Russia's new president, a former, AHEM, law professor at the country's most respected law school, but you don't choose to go to the ECHR. You have to exhaust local legal remedies first.

So in a perverse way, it almost sounds like Medvedev is saying that people should just quit their bitching and accept the heinously biased judgments handed down by the Russian courts (keep in mind every Russian case that goes to Strasbourg is one that was lost in the Supreme Court).

Medvedev Wants Judicial Oversight

2008-12-02T07:58:00.000-05:00

Grani.ru reports that President Medvedev is calling for increased judicial oversight to tackle problems of transparency in Russian courts. One of his proposals would be to publish information on the courts, including in some sort of online forum.

Even better, he is calling for the creation of a "single disciplinary organ" that will be capable of exerting pressure (воздействие) on judges. The official reasoning for this is to review conflicts that might unduly sway judicial opinions. We'll see how that goes.

I'm "sure" this will go a long way toward establishing a Russian judiciary that is completely independent from the rest of the government. The best way to do this is clearly to create a disciplinary body to keep an eye on things. Is it even worth asking who that body will answer to?

Six-Year Term: Does it Make a Difference?

2008-12-01T09:35:00.000-05:00

I love this picture... From RFE/RL.

Guess what? It doesn't! Bwaaaahahahaha!

Ok, on to the real reason for this post: Kremlinology! In other words, is this just another iteration of план Путина? (Yes.) Does it tell us anything about the current regime's vision of the future? (Maybe.) Is it a response to the current instability in the market in general and Russia's economy in general? (Probably not.)

So it seems pretty clear that, in the grand scheme of things, this won't make too much of a difference in the way Russia is governed. It's no secret that Putin runs the show, whether he's in the President's seat or that of the PM. Of course, that's based on the admittedly large assumption that Medvedev, who constitutionally controls the PM, won't get it into his Deep Purple-loving skull to assert his authority. For now, though, that possibility seems fairly remote, especially given Medvedev's political dependence on Putin, without whom he would still be a law professor in St. Petersburg. Thus, in short, Putin will keep hold of the reigns for the foreseeable future.

Putin is also claiming (through a spokesman) that he won't seek to get back into office early by making Medvedev step down. Of course, if the economic crisis continues to worsen for Russia, that could change, but for now, let's say Putin stays put.

As to whether this is part of Plan Putina, I guess it's a tough call to make, but given the fact that calls for the extension of term limits have been circulating well back in the second Putin term, it's probably a good bet to make. Of course, Mr. "I don't want to amend the constitution" would claim otherwise, but, ummm, I don't believe him. This is probably the best possible end-run around those statements, as it gives Putin plausible deniability and a bit of distance between him and these reforms.

The same logic applies to the "economic crisis" line of thinking: since talk of term-limit extensions has been percolating since long before this crisis got going, it seems unlikely that this amendment is motivated solely by Russia's current state. BUT, we shouldn't rule out the possibility that the crisis was responsible for shifting the timetable forward.

Additionally, given Putin's statements about not cutting Dima's term short, it seems pretty hard to believe that he's trying to get in the door now with a longer term in order to ride out the crisis without worrying too much about popular support. Of course, all of that is predicated on the notion that popular support equals electability in Russia, which any Yeltsin biographer should be able to disabuse you of.

So, in short, riddle, it's cold outside. Wrap this enigma and this mystery around you and try to stay warm...