The Ukrainian Presidential Election and Roe v. Wade

The Ukrainian presidential election is giving many a democratizer an important lesson in the dangers of overplaying one's hand. This is especially ironic, since the last election in 2004 was touted to have offered precisely the same lesson to Russia. Of course, there is more to the country's disgust with its erstwhile superstar President Yushchenko than just his ardent pro-Western stance--his efforts were often hampered by a ridiculous constitutional deal that was hashed out during the throes of the Orange Revolution, splitting powers between the executive and the prime minister. But it's safe to say that a great deal of backlash resulted from Yushchenko's policies.

Which brings me to Roe v. Wade. Without dipping into the merits of that case, there are scholars that claim quite convincingly, that massive efforts at social change like Roe, or for that matter even like Brown v. Board of Ed., should be left to the democratic process, rather than achieved through a hail-mary touchdown in the Supreme Court. To bastardize their arguments, Supreme Court decisions of this sort result in a great deal of backlash, in part because they become lightning rods for a still significant number of dissenters. (Compare the reaction to Roe to that following Lawrence v. Texas, when the Court was arguably further behind the social curve.)

It is better, the thinking goes, to slowly boil the frog through a series of democratic referenda, before sealing the deal with a constitutional decision, since this gives the electorate more time to get used to the idea of certain rights. Of course, that argument presupposes a certain amount of stupidity or at least acquiescence on the part of opposition voters that may simply not exist--I can't think of too many people who just forget about a political process simply because it takes a while. It also assumes that progress is possible through the democratic process, which is debatable at times. But the broader point remains that people prefer to deliberate, rather than having a controversial point shoved down their throats by forces seemingly beyond their control.

The same is true in "progressive" elections in the former Soviet Union. Empirically, only two color revolutions could possibly be deemed successful--in Georgia and Serbia--and both of those required a far more powerful catalyst to remain sustainable (even calling Georgia sustainable is a bit of a stretch). In Serbia, it was the sclerotic rule of Slobodan Milosevic and the ruin he had brought upon the country; and in Georgia it was a mix of anti-cronyism and subsequent strident anti-Russianism that has kept Saakashvili in power. But in countries like Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, where such motivating factors were largely absent, the pro-Western policies of the newly elected executives failed to find much traction.

In hindsight, it seems plausible at least that issues like EU and NATO integration, political liberalization, and the end of the post-Soviet system were better left to slow, plodding politics than the razzle-dazzle of street protests. On the other hand, of course, without the "revolution" of 2004, it would have been business as usual for Kyiv, just as abortions would have remained in legal limbo following Roe. Perhaps, then, the proper conclusion to draw is that, no matter how complete the failure of the color revolutions may seem, the long-term gains may yet be realized.