Abkhazia and South Ossetia: No Exit

Russia, it seems, has painted itself and the rest of the international community into a very tight corner. By taking a diplomatic stance it cannot retreat from and recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign, independent states, Russia has both intensified and severely complicated the long-running internal conflict in Georgia. The Kremlin cannot back away from that position, for obvious reasons, nor can the rest of the world accept it. There is no Rhodesia option on the table either: with Russia a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it seems unlikely that the UNSC would issue a resolution condemning independence and forbidding recognition.

What are the options, then, for Tbilisi and the vast majority of the international community that does not recognize the two breakaway republics? The status quo will not do, for the simple reason that no matter how vociferously states object to Abkhaz and Ossetian independence, the longer those governments continue to exist, the closer they come to de facto sovereignty. Acceptance and recognition are also clearly not on the table.

A suit by Georgia against Russia in the ICJ for breach of the prohibition on aggression would be fraught with difficulties, most of which relate to the Court's jurisdiction. (As a side note, the pending ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo might yield some important legal ground for Georgia's claims, though Russia is unlikely to acquiesce to the application of such an opinion to the current situation.)

Abkhazia and South Ossetia both present troubling problems to the world of international law, as they represent another case of the impossibility of applying existing and well-established law. Russia, somewhat like the United States in Iraq, has invented a situation that gives it grounds to invade Georgia and interfere in that state's internal affairs. Yet, again like the US, because Russia is part of the P5, the UNSC is powerless; and because Russia will not, of course, agree to the ICJ's jurisdiction in the matter, the Court will also be unable to act. The UN General Assembly could request an advisory opinion from the ICJ under Article 96, but again, this would have only questionable effect on the actual situation on the ground in Georgia.

The only possible way out that I see is for Georgia to wait calmly for Russia's promises to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to ring hollow, while persistently objecting to their sovereignty. Tbilisi should offer Tskhinvali and Sukhumi as much aid and cooperation as possible, coupled with healthy doses of pragmatism ("Do you really want the Russians meddling in your affairs all the time?"). This, of course, has a range of unpleasant practical and legal implications: Georgia would have to somehow get through the physical and diplomatic barriers that exist between the territory it controls and that held by the breakaway regions; and in doing so, it could be seen to have acquiesced to their sovereignty. That is probably what Sergei Lavrov is seeking to do by pressuring Georgia to sign a non-aggression pact with Abkhazia. What is more, with Russian aid being pumped into the regions (notwithstanding the disputes as to how well that aid is being distributed), it is unlikely that Georgia could match Moscow's resources to provide a more attractive alternative to its breakaway territories.

I wonder how the climate is in Northern Cyprus this time of year...